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Introduction  
Nuclear proliferation is arguably one of the greatest threats to international security in the post-
Cold War world. Some argue that recent efforts to proliferate by Iraq, Iran and North Korea 
demonstrate the failure of diplomacy under the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. They 
argue that these countries’ breakouts from the regime and/or evasive maneuvers to avoid the 
regime are succeeding and require new tools and programs to prevent and/or cut off such 
proliferation. But is the nonproliferation regime the problem? Is diplomacy so ineffective? Are 
tougher counterproliferation programs and even military actions needed to stop proliferation?  
A careful review of attempts to address proliferation problems in the last decade have involved 
some grave mistakes, ones which years of diplomacy might have foreshadowed had the 
protagonists listened, especially to the international community. It is also true that several 
geopolitical events over the last fifteen years have contributed to making proliferation prevention 
more difficult. But, these problems are external to the regime and do not mean the regime is 
falling apart. Geopolitical changes have made proliferation prevention harder, but only increased 
the importance of the nonproliferation regime and diplomacy. What is required is some innovation 
in and strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but the regime is worth the effort.  
The nuclear nonproliferation regime has limited actual nuclear weapons development to nine 
countries as of today; five enshrined in the treaty, three outside the treaty, and sometime in this 
decade, one more—North Korea. Not a bad track record if one considers President Kennedy’s 
concerns voiced in 1963 that we might have as many as 25 nuclear weapons countries by the 
1970s. Successful nonproliferation efforts have been carried out since the 1970s largely through 
diplomacy. These efforts, frequently along with simultaneous and fortuitous changes in national 
leadership, have led to several regime successes in South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, 
Sweden, and three of the former Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus.  
So where have mistakes been made? In three areas: loss of faith in the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT); hegemonic efforts to intervene in cases of suspected proliferation without 
multilateral consent, and use of counterproliferation measures that allow for only zero-sum 
outcomes and leave the loser no chance for face-saving.  
Proliferation prevention efforts in North Korea, Iraq and Iran all suffered from these mistakes, and 
success is not any closer in the cases of Iran and North Korea. The costs of the 2003 war in Iraq, 
titularly to stop Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program, have monumentally 
outweighed the proliferation problem. 
Why Diplomacy?  
If one looks at why states proliferate, there is usually another state or states that have created the 
sense in the would-be proliferator of relative weakness. Thus, proliferating states choose this path 
for status among countries, because of regional insecurity, economic insecurity, perceived 
asymmetric military weakness, and even natural resource shortages. Each of these reasons 
involves interrelations among states or between them. As a consequence, if the relevant states 
are willing to establish a dialogue to address the perceptions of the proliferator and resolve them 
to both (or all relevant) states’ satisfaction, most proliferation problems can be resolved. This type 
of negotiation where there is usually some give and take on both (or all sides) can be considered 
traditional nonproliferation diplomacy. It offers the opportunity for both (all) sides to gain 
something they need to manage their domestic and/or international relationships after they bow to 
international demands.  
On the other hand, some have argued that it is implausible, or will be unsuccessful, to address 
these perceptions through diplomatic negotiations, because some proliferators will never trust 
approaches from the international community or are themselves inherently untrustworthy. These 
reasons have been used to argue for different anti-proliferation approaches and often harsher 
ones.  
Complicating Factors  
As mentioned earlier, significant geopolitical changes in the last fifteen years have affected the 
regime and have made proliferation prevention more complex. First was the global strategic 
balance shift from two superpowers to one, which prompted many countries to create different 
alliances to solve world problems like proliferation. It has also led to a new level of global 
instability, especially as the “balance” sustained by the Cold War has disappeared. This instability 
may have heightened the value of nuclear weapons in states caught by the ensuing imbalance, 
such as North Korea.  
Second, in the last fifteen years, access to nuclear technology, equipment and know-how has 
grown through legal and illegal means. More countries are considering or have begun to develop 
nuclear power programs for energy security, diversity of supply, and recently, in the face of global 
climate change. Nuclear research programs are becoming more publicly acceptable to solve 
development problems such as the need for access to clean water through desalination or to 
reduce public health threats by medical isotope production and food irradiation.  
More troubling has been access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology through the 
successful, illicit nuclear market, especially the black market of A.Q. Khan of Pakistan that was 
finally exposed in 2004. In operation for perhaps as many as twenty years, this market helped 
both Iran, North Korea and possibly Iraq to develop clandestine nuclear programs with 
proliferation sensitive nuclear technology without international knowledge and supervision under 
the nonproliferation regime. In particular, Khan’s market enabled Iran and North Korea to evade 
the international controls on the trade of sensitive nuclear technologies and commodities 
established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and gain access to centrifuge uranium 
enrichment technology and equipment. [1] Thankfully, use of centrifuge enrichment technology is 
not straightforward and requires skill, as we learned from the fact that apparently neither North 
Korea nor Iran may have yet succeeded in their operations; but the skills can be developed with 
practice.  
The break-up of the Soviet Union appears to have increased access to nuclear materials, as 
strong Soviet controls over widespread nuclear materials used in Russia and its client states were 
weakened or eliminated. Subsequently, some of these materials may have been marketed illicitly, 
especially within the former Soviet states.  
These legal and illegal pathways have made nuclear material, equipment and technology more 
easily accessible to all countries, which can ease the job of a state determined to proliferate. The 
illicit paths for nuclear material and technology have made implementation of the standard 
controls in the nonproliferation regime more difficult, i.e., International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards and inspections, and at the same time more important, as they are a chief line 
of defense.  
Until 1997, the IAEA depended on a state’s willingness to declare what kinds and amounts of 
nuclear materials, technology and equipment it possessed. If the state did not declare the 
material, the IAEA believed it had no mandate to search for undeclared nuclear materials and 
facilities. The revelation of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 led to the 
realization that IAEA safeguards needed to be strengthened to increase the transparency of 
states’ nuclear programs and allow the Agency to search for undeclared nuclear activities. With 
the introduction of an Additional Protocol (AP) amendment to its IAEA safeguards agreement, a 
state can be requested to allow the IAEA to search for clandestine nuclear material and facilities. 
However, not all states have an AP in place; a relevant example is Iran.  
IAEA controls, however, cannot always identify and alert the international community of 
proliferation. Moreover, even if the Agency identifies a proliferator, it has little to no enforcement 
power. The burden for managing and punishing proliferators is transferred to nation states acting 
through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Consensus votes in the UNSC provide the 
mechanism for invoking sanctions or other restraints on a proliferating nation.  
But here is the third change that has affected the NPT regime. Over the last 15 years, nations 
have turned to the UNSC several times to sanction Iraq, North Korea and Iran. While consensus 
was reached in the early 1990s to take action against proliferation in Iraq and North Korea, 
international consensus has become harder to achieve in this decade. This is due at minimum to 
the fact that many countries, including U.S. allies, opposed the U.S. action to attack Iraq in 2003 
and no longer support U.S. leadership. The fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found 
in Iraq—the primary rationale for the war—exacerbated mistrust of the United States. Deep 
concerns remain that the United States and its ally, Britain, chose to act without UNSC support. 
This has been especially apparent in subsequent relations among the permanent members of the 
UNSC, or the P-5: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Consensus among these states, or at minimum, assurance that no P-5 state will work at cross 
purposes with the others, is important to ensure concerted international action when cases of 
proliferation concern arise. In the recent sanctions cases in the Security Council for North Korea 
and Iran, the P-5 have been less willing or unwilling to work together, sometimes apparently in a 
desire to balance—or blunt—U.S. leadership. Nonproliferation has been also given different 
priority in P-5 foreign policies over time as compared to other strategic objectives, so consensus 
making would not be straightforward in any event because national interests of a P-5 state might 
take precedence, such as China’s and France’s oil interests with Iran.  
The lack of P-5 consensus limits the ability of the UNSC to enforce the nonproliferation regime 
because the P-5, and only the P-5, has the right to veto a UNSC action. One veto stops UNSC 
action. Global competition among the P-5 is increasing as the five countries jockey for 
international leadership in the evolving global balance caused by waning international support for 
U.S. leadership, especially on nonproliferation. The P-5 split has increased the power of other 
international groupings of countries such as the non-aligned nations and the G-77. In fact, the 
political and technical maneuvers of Iran and North Korea have been successful in building 
sympathy in the non P-5 nations so that they block consensus on strong sanctions against these 
two proliferators.  
The three changes above—the change from a bipolar to a unipolar world, increased access to 
nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and lack of consensus among the P-5 in jointly 
addressing proliferators—indicate that diplomacy, always a messy trade, is getting much tougher 
as a means to solve proliferation problems. But not impossible, as the Six Party Talks agreement 
of February 13, 2007 demonstrates. China, Russia, and the United States, partnered with South 
Korea and Japan, worked closely together to reach an agreement with North Korea. Perhaps the 
fact that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon on October 9 provided sufficient urgency and 
impetus for consensus.  
A history of the diplomatic negotiations with North Korea is presented below as a case study 
applying the issues discussed in the preceding discussion and to illustrate the growing 
complications of responding to a state that has determined that nuclear weapons are necessary 
for its security. With the benefit of hindsight, the history indicates the deadly importance of 
continuing to engage diplomatically, and the progress made when a win-win deal can be found. 
Negotiating with North Korea  
Getting North Korea into the nonproliferation regime was not easy. Under pressure from the 
Soviets, North Korea finally signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. But, Pyongyang 
soon raised international concern over its proliferation intentions. In 1989, a nuclear fuel 
reprocessing facility appeared at its Yongbyon nuclear site,[2] the need for which was unclear if 
North Korea’s nuclear program was to be peaceful. Such a facility appeared to demonstrate North 
Korea’s interest in developing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The United States and it allies, 
South Korea and Japan, consulted and each took actions to discourage North Korea from 
completing and operating its reprocessing plant. They all pressed North Korea to conclude its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA so that inspections could begin and assure the world that its 
nuclear program was intended only for peaceful use. But North Korea balked, indicating that while 
the United States continued to have nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, it would not 
agree to sign a safeguards agreement. In September 1991, President Bush announced unilateral 
withdrawal of all tactical land and sea-based nuclear weapons world-wide for many reasons. 
Usefully, it coincided with North Korea’s demand and shortly afterwards South Korea announced 
that no U.S. nuclear weapons existed in South Korea.[3] In January 1992, North Korea signed its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  
Meanwhile, North Korea’s patron, the Soviet Union, was disintegrating. North Korea, apparently 
beginning to see a new weakness in its strategic position, joined the United Nations in September 
1991. Three months later, it entered into a denuclearization agreement with South Korea, and in 
January 1992 finally concluded its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  
However, tensions reemerged between the Koreas, and between the North and the United States 
when no progress was made on the denuclearization agreement and when the IAEA safeguards 
inspections in mid-1992 turned up discrepancies between North Korea’s declaration and other 
information the IAEA had collected on the North’s programs. This one-step-forward and one-step-
backward progress with North Korea became a continued pattern of action between the 
international community and North Korea, seeming to make diplomacy a failed mechanism with 
North Korea because no one could trust that it would do what it agreed to do. The inability of the 
U.S. or South Korea, Japan, and others to rely on North Korea’s willingness to maintain a 
commitment beyond a few months or meet the full requirements of a commitment made 
sustained interest in and real forward progress in negotiations with it difficult. Yet the national 
security and international security implications of failure to engage North Korea were clear, so 
efforts continued.  
In 1993, as tensions mounted, the IAEA requested a special inspection at Yongbyon to verify that 
North Korea had not diverted spent reactor fuel from its Soviet-supplied reactor to its 
reprocessing plant. However North Korea refused and shocked the world by instead announcing 
on March 12, 1993 that it would withdraw from the NPT rather than endure IAEA inspections. The 
extreme position taken by North Korea was meant to force the international community into letting 
North Korea go about its business without further meddling. But the nonproliferation community 
reacted quickly and the governments on the IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the 
United Nations Security Council. The hope was that consensus of the Security Council would 
leave even the isolated North Korea with little choice but to comply with IAEA safeguards. In April 
1993 the IAEA added to the pressure, declaring that it could not guarantee that North Korea was 
not diverting nuclear material for peaceful purposes. The UNSC passed a resolution in May 
calling on North Korea to fully comply with its international nonproliferation obligations and asked 
all countries to facilitate this solution.[4]  
During this tumultuous year, some contact was made with North Korea by either the United 
States, the IAEA, or one of the North’s regional neighbors; at least once a month contact was 
made trying to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Five contacts were 
made with Pyongyang in February alone as North Korea escalated the terms under which it 
would comply with international requests. It might seem these efforts to pressure North Korea 
were pointless, or worse, harmful, because in March North Korea withdrew from the NPT. But in 
June, following bilateral talks with the United States, North Korea suspended its decision to 
withdraw from the NPT and agreed to full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards.[5] So had 
North Korea declared it was withdrawing from the NPT as a shock to get the international 
community’s and especially, the United States’, attention? The United States did react, but in 
return for North Korea’s decision to suspend its withdrawal, also granted North Korea assurances 
against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. The United States further agreed 
not to interfere in North Korea’s internal affairs. In effect, a win-win occurred for both sides.  
Bilateral talks continued in July on a good note, with North Korea agreeing to begin consultations 
with the IAEA on “outstanding safeguards and other issues.” There was also a joint statement 
indicating North Korea might agree to a deal with the United States to replace its graphite 
reactors with light water ones. At this point, the United States needed to reassure South Korea 
and in July, President Clinton spoke before the Korean National Assembly reaffirming U.S. 
security assurances for South Korea and its commitment to the U.S. military presence as “a 
bedrock of U.S. security policy in the Asian Pacific.”[6]  
However, it appears the North did not like this move by President Clinton or some other fact, as 
the good news did not last. In the autumn of 1993, North Korea was again not meeting its 
commitments and a third round of bilateral talks was postponed. In fact, the Central Intelligence 
Agency was now reporting that North Korea had separated about 12 kilograms of plutonium. (And 
by early 1994 CIA estimated that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear 
weapons.)[7] Such intelligence was exactly the kind of information that made U.S. and South 
Korean officials question North Korea’s intent to keep its commitments and to rethink what could 
be done to ensure the North met its commitments. North Korea’s weak commitment record clearly 
required innovative thinking about how to structure an agreement that gave us what we needed, 
but also gave North Korea a strong incentive to act in accord with the agreement for its own 
benefit. Probably most important was to ensure North Korea did not get what it wanted until the 
United States and its partners got what they wanted.[8]  
With the news of North Korea’s possible weapons development, the IAEA intensified its efforts. In 
February 1994, North Korea and the IAEA finalized their agreement to allow IAEA inspections of 
North Korea’s seven declared facilities. By this action North Korea averted U.N. sanctions, but 
almost as soon as it had escaped these, it pulled back on its commitment. When the IAEA 
inspectors arrived, they were not allowed to inspect the plutonium reprocessing plant at 
Yongbyon as had been agreed. In May 1994, the IAEA confirmed that North Korea had begun to 
remove spent fuel from its research reactor, which lent support to the previous CIA report that 
North Korea had separated plutonium and possibly made a nuclear weapon.  
The seriousness of these developments in North Korea led to a concerted U.S. effort to 
strengthen its military readiness in South Korea but also to intensify diplomatic efforts, including 
reaching out to China to help pressure North Korea to suspend its nuclear operations. North 
Korea continued to defy the international community and in June pulled out of the IAEA. The 
United States responded by stepping up its interactions with North Korea, now that the IAEA was 
seen to have no role.[9]  
The United States considered a military attack,[10] but instead relied on diplomacy, carried out by 
former President Carter, to open up a channel for further bilateral negotiations. In these ensuing 
negotiations, North Korea finally agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear reactors 
and related facilities under the Agreed Framework signed in 1994. The Agreed Framework 
required North Korea to freeze construction of its nuclear reactors and their related facilities, and 
in return provided for two light water reactors and other energy assistance until these reactors 
were completed.  
With the Agreed Framework in hand, the United States, Japan and South Korea created 
multilateral support for the Framework by establishing a revolutionary new international 
organization, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to coordinate and fund the 
reactor projects and energy assistance.[11] KEDO staff were hired to develop and implement the 
reactor project. Negotiation of the reactor project with North Korea was difficult, tedious and 
intense. Over 100 meetings were held with North Korea in the ten years of its operations with 
thousands of hours of work to build a common vocabulary and a sense of trust between North 
Korea and the KEDO members.[12]  
The years between 1994 and 2000 were characterized by constant slippage on the part of North 
Korea. The North would issue invitations to the IAEA for safeguards inspections, and then refuse 
to comply with inspection requirements. It appears that Pyongyang kept up clandestine efforts to 
move closer towards reprocessing the spent fuel from its 5 MW reactor. But the overall climate 
was improving. In 1999, South Korea proclaimed its sunshine policy and the United States 
relaxed sanctions on North Korea. By the fall of 2000, the progress with North Korea seemed real 
and in October Secretary of State Albright visited North Korea and met with Kim Jong Il. Her visit 
was tied to continued progress on bilateral missile talks in which North Korea would agree to stop 
missile testing and exports. However, the last negotiating session in November 2000 did not 
result in agreement. Shortly thereafter, the elections in the United States turned the process of 
negotiating with North Korea over to a new administration.  
At the beginning of the Bush presidency, it seemed that the administration was leaning towards 
continuing the progress made by the Clinton administration in both nuclear and missile talks. Yet, 
the U.S. attitude towards the North appeared to change in March 2001, when President Bush met 
with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. North Korea, perhaps looking to find a way to slow 
the process down, or to test the meaning of Bush’s statement that “any negotiations would 
require complete verification of the terms of any potential agreement”[13] cancelled political 
reconciliation talks. Two days later, the North made it clear that it believed Bush wished to 
sabotage the North-South talks, declaring North Korea “fully prepared for both dialogue and 
war”[14] with the United States.  
With a comprehensive policy review of North Korea completed in June 2001, President Bush’s 
envoy initiated new discussions with the North Korean representative to the United Nations in 
New York. Over the next nine months, however, the situation deteriorated. In his State of the 
Union address in January 2002, President Bush named North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil.” 
In March 2002, the new U.S. Nuclear Posture discussed the use of nuclear weapons against 
North Korea, provoking an angry response. Relations remain on tenderhooks as the first concrete 
was poured in the KEDO reactor project in June 2002, but new sanctions were also imposed by 
the United States on North Korea. In a trilateral meeting that brought together the United States, 
China and North Korea in April, the North for the first time announced it had a nuclear weapons 
program. In October, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State James Kelly visited North Korea, but no 
statement followed; two weeks later, Kelly announced that North Korea admitted to him that it had 
begun a uranium enrichment program.  
This announcement started a cascade of reactions. The KEDO heavy fuel oil shipments were 
suspended in November. In December 2002, North Korea sent a letter to the IAEA saying it was 
restarting its 5 MW reactor and asked the IAEA to remove its seals on the other frozen facilities. 
And at the end of December, the DPRK ordered the IAEA out the country. [15] In January 2003, 
North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the NPT, effective the next day.  
The gravity of this action energized efforts for further negotiations with North Korea and in August 
2003 the first Six Party Talks were held. The purpose of the Six Parties was to ensure regional 
partners who had a stake in the solution were there to participate in resolving the problem, but 
also to reduce the emphasis on the bilateral U.S.-North Korea relationship.  
Little progress appears to have been made in the talks and in November 2003 KEDO announced 
it was suspending reactor construction. One more Six Party meeting was held in June 2004, but 
essentially all appears to have been quiet until February 2005, when North Korea announced it 
was indefinitely suspending participation in the Six Party Talks and declared it had manufactured 
nuclear weapons. Significant effort was made to stimulate U.S. action to engage North Korea 
during this time frame. Specifically, the previous participants in the Agreed Framework noted:  
To the contrary, now that the North has restarted its nuclear program, every day it increases both 
its nuclear capabilities and the price it will demand to give them up. Hoping that regime change 
will stop North Korean nuclear weapons before they wreak havoc would recklessly gamble with 
our security.[16]  
The Six Party Talks were not restarted until July 2005. It appears possible that once again North 
Korea was looking for U.S. attention because once the talks resumed progress was made and in 
September 2005 agreement was reached on a joint statement among the Six Parties. This did not 
last more than one day before North Korea denounced the agreement. This may have been 
because of actions by the U.S. Treasury to limit transactions with the Macao Bank which 
apparently North Korea used frequently. The transactions were stopped as the U.S. Department 
of Treasury claimed the bank was laundering money for North Korea. North Korea bitterly 
demanded that the United States meet to discuss the issue. No meeting was forthcoming and 
apparently relations between North Korea and KEDO soured so significantly that KEDO 
terminated its project in June 2006.  
Whether this action triggered them or not, on the 4th and 5th of July North Korea tested its 
missiles, angering the international community sufficiently enough that on July 15 the UNSC 
unanimously condemned North Korea’s tests. Not to let things rest, North Korea tested the limits 
of the international community when on October 9 2006 it tested one of its nuclear “weapons.” In 
five days the UNSC acted unanimously voting to increase sanctions on North Korea. But, was 
this the last straw for the five countries? For the United States? Luckily, within four months, the 
Six Party Talks were restarted and on February 13 they announced a new agreement on closing 
down North Korea’s nuclear operations. Perhaps North Korea agreed because it perceived that it 
had wandered too far from the norm? It is not clear, but, within ten days after agreement was 
reached, North Korea followed through on its first obligation by inviting the Director General of the 
IAEA to visit. And now we sit and wait to see if this agreement can lead to a positive, non-nuclear 
North Korea. Recent U.S. actions to address the Macao bank issue appear to be offering a more 
activist U.S. role. Is this a change in USG interest in working with the regional group and North 
Korea to solve the problem?  
The negotiations of the mid 1990s did lead to an agreement that limited North Korea’s ability to 
develop its nuclear weapons by limiting access to its spent fuel to separate the plutonium for 
weapons. Moreover, the history appears to indicate that it was when North Korea was not 
engaged in talks with the five parties, sometime in 2003-2005, that it was able to get access to 
the nuclear material and the time needed to reprocess its nuclear fuel to obtain bomb material 
and possibly develop some nuclear warheads. 
Now that North Korea apparently has nuclear weapons, the job of the Six Party negotiations is 
easily orders of magnitude harder. Nuclear weapons may have provided North Korea with a new 
sense of power that makes finding a win-win deal with it much more difficult. But, history tells us a 
win-win deal is what is needed with North Korea. The bottom line now is whether the five parties 
are able to find sufficient incentives to convince North Korea to give up the weapons that it may 
view as providing the military power needed to fend off the United States, its long term foe, and 
the regional power to broker regime protection from its neighbors.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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